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The tax systems of EU Member States have many
features that reflect the fact that, until recently, the
Member States were independent nations.
Corporate income taxes, which are based on distinct
national definitions of taxable income, separate
accounting and the arm’s length standard, provide
the most striking and best known example of “lega-
cy” EU tax systems that are not appropriate for an
economic union.1 Less appreciated is the need to
reform the taxation of commercial motor fuel – that
used in trucks and buses – to make it consistent with
economic union.
The perceived problem and the European
Commission’s flawed solution
In the EU commercial motor fuel is taxed where it is
bought,instead of where it is consumed,just like fuel
used in private automobiles. Unlike a destination-
based system for taxing motor fuels, this purchase-
based system has a number of undesirable economic
and fiscal implications, unless tax rates are uniform.2
There is an obvious incentive to purchase motor fuel
where,all else equal,tax rates are lowest.This means
that the location of fueling stations may not be opti-
mal – that they are likely to be concentrated in low-
tax jurisdictions, especially near borders with high-
tax jurisdictions. Truckers with greatest access to
low-taxed fuels may compete unfairly with others
located in high-tax jurisdictions. The distribution of
tax bases among Member States is likely to be tilted
toward low-tax jurisdictions, rather than reflecting
distance traveled in each Member State,as would be
more appropriate under the benefit principle of tax-
ation. There is thus an incentive for Member States
to engage in destructive tax competition; they may
set rates below the level they might otherwise prefer
either to “poach” the tax base of other Member
States or to protect against poaching.The European
Commission (2002, 10-11) explains the problem as
follows, as it relates to taxation of commercial 
motor fuel:
“The large range of trucks allows hauliers to pur-
chase a significant part of their diesel fuel in
Member States where excise duties are the lowest.
Member States which set high rates lose a large pro-
portion of their excise receipts to the profit of
Member States applying lower taxation. This tax
competition between Member States leads to an ero-
sion of budgetary resources and prevent (sic)
Member States wishing to implement an auto-
nomous policy”.
The European Commission perceives the root of the
problems just described to be the diversity of tax
rates applied to commercial motor fuel.This is seen
clearly in the following assessment from a Commis-
sion staff working document issued in 2006:
“Objective and root problem to be addressed: the
existing differences in excise taxes produce distor-
tions in internal market competition within the road
transport market as they introduce an important fis-
cal advantage or disadvantage within competition
which is independent from the internal efficiency
and costs of road transport firms; any excessive dif-
ferences in tax levels, especially on fuel, would need
to be narrowed, a convergence of taxation levels
would be therefore advisable”. 3
In order to ameliorate these problems, the EU has
long set minimum tax rates for commercial motor
fuels (that used by trucks weighing more than
7.5 tons and buses).Most recently,in March 2007,the
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1 McLure (2008c) and literature cited there discuss the need to
replace the present corporate tax system with one based on a com-
mon tax base, consolidation and formula apportionment – and the
prospects for doing so.
2 See European Commission (2007a; 2007b). 3 European Commission (2006).European Commission proposed that the minimum
rates be raised in stages from the then-applicable
302 euros per 1,000 liters to 380 euros per 1,000 liters
in 2014.4 Although the Council has not yet adopted
this proposal, Member States have begun to raise
their tax rates, perhaps in anticipation of its adop-
tion.Even so,there remain substantial differences in
the tax rates prevailing in various Member States;
see Table 1 for the rates at the beginning of 
January 2009.5
The real problem and the ideal solution
The first-best solution to the problems described
above is not to be found in minimum rates, because
diversity of rates is not the root of the problem.6The
problem arises because motor fuel is taxed where it
is purchased, rather than where it is consumed.
Minimum tax rates reduce the distortions of eco-
nomic decisions,including the incentives for destruc-
tive tax competition, but do not eliminate them.7 As
long as commercial motor fuel is taxed in the
Member State where it is bought, these distortions
will remain, unless rates are uniform. Of course,
mandating minimum rates – and, a fortiori, mandat-
ing uniform rates – interferes with the fiscal sover-
eignty of Member States.Beyond that,uniform rates
would not necessarily produce a rational division of
revenues among Member States;there would proba-
bly be a tendency for tax revenues to be concentrat-
ed at the beginning and end of trips, rather than
being divided among Member States in proportion
to distance traveled in each.
The ideal solution is conceptually simple and has
long been employed in the United States:rather than
taxing commercial motor fuel where it is purchased,
states tax fuel where it is consumed.This is achieved
by apportioning consumption of commercial motor
fuel among the states on the basis of the distance a
vehicle travels in each. Unlike taxation based on
where fuel is purchased, this apportionment-based
system accords relatively well with the benefit prin-
ciple of taxation and produces a rational distribution
of revenues.8 There are no incentives to buy fuel
where it is cheapest, no unfair competition among
carriers, and no tax competition among states,
because any price difference is eliminated by appor-
tionment.9 Finally,this system respects the fiscal sov-
ereignty of states; each state is free to apply the tax
rate of its choice to its portion of the total fuel con-
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Table 1  
Taxation of commercial diesel fuel, January 2009 (euros per 1000 liters) 
































































a) If several diesel fuels are on the market, the rate reported is for low sulphur fuel. –
 b) Includes CO2 tax.
Source: European Commission, Directorate General Taxation and Customs Union Tax Policy, Excise Duty Tables:
Part II – Energy Products and Electricity, January 2009, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/excise_duties/energy_products/rates/excise_duties-
part_II_energy_products-en.pdf.
4 European Commission (2007a). The European Economic and
Social Committee of the European Parliament (2007) ex-
pressed reservations regarding some aspects of the Commis-
sion’s proposals, and the European Parliament (2008) amended
the proposal to reflect these concerns and set a lower ultimate
level of the minimum tax rate (359 euros), to be reached a year
later. These amendments are not relevant for the present dis-
cussion.
5 In mid-2006, because of derogations granted during a transition
period, nine Member States had tax rates below the mandated min-
imum of 302 euros per 1.000 liters. By the beginning of 2009 the tax
rates of only two,Cyprus and Romania,still fell below the minimum.
6 The arguments presented here are laid out in somewhat greater
detail in McLure (2009) and in much greater detail in McLure
(2008a) and (2008b).
7 Kanbur and Keen (1993) analyze tax competition and cross-bor-
der shopping, assuming that taxes ostensibly follow the destination
principle but there are no border tax adjustments on purchases by
non-residents, a description of the taxation of commercial (and
other) motor fuels in the EU. Apportionment-based taxation of
motor fuel is equivalent to taxation with border tax adjustments.
8 McLure (2009) presents the case for destination-based taxation of
commercial motor fuel, which is the outcome of apportionment-
based taxation. Although origin-based taxation can be justified in
some instances (for example, to compensate for external damage
associated with the refining of motor fuels),it is difficult to think of
a persuasive argument for purchase-based taxation. Contrary to
the situation with cross-border purchases of alcoholic beverages,
tobacco products,and motor fuel consumed in private automobiles,
where it is difficult to devise means of implementing destination-
based taxation that would not unduly hinder the internal market,
apportionment offers the opportunity to achieve destination-based
taxation for commercial motor fuel – see McLure (2008a).
9 Also, there is no need to impose different rates of tax on com-
mercial and non-commercial motor fuel at the pump and (if there
are no such differences) no need to refund the difference in tax
rates on the two types of fuel, an approach has been found to be
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sumed. The good sense of this system is seen in the
fact that the Canadian provinces voluntarily partici-
pate in it.
The mechanics of apportionment
Table 2 illustrates the mechanics of apportionment.
The first three columns set out the underlying
assumptions. During the year a trucker purchases
10,000 gallons of fuel in Utah and 90,000 gallons in
Nevada, for a total of 100,000 gallons, as shown in
column (1), paying the rate of tax shown in column
(2) at the time of purchase.The truck travels a total
of 600,000 miles during a year, 120,000 in Utah and
480,000 in Nevada, as shown in column (3).Thus the
average number of miles per gallon (MPG) is 6.0,
shown in column (4). From this and the assumed
number of miles traveled in each state, the number
of gallons of fuel apportioned to each state can be
calculated (20,000 in Utah and 80,000 in Nevada), as
shown in column (5). Each state’s “Net untaxed gal-
lons,”shown in column (5),is the difference between
what it has taxed (column 1) and what it should tax
(column 4).Thus,Utah is due tax on 10,000 more gal-
lons of fuel than it has taxed at the pump and
Nevada has collected tax on 10,000 gallons more
than the amount apportioned to it.Multiplying these
figures by the state tax rates in column (2) indicates
that the trucker owes Utah 2,800 US dollars and
should receive as a refund of 3,200 US dollars from
Nevada, as shown in column (7).10
Implementing apportionment
The apportionment-based taxation of commercial
fuels in the United States has historically been based
on manual record-keeping of the distance traveled in
each state.Whether it would be advisable for the EU
to switch to apportionment-based taxation, if it
could only rely on manual record keeping, which is
inefficient and vulnerable to error and fraud, is not
obvious; the compliance and administrative costs
might outweigh the manifest benefits. It seems, how-
ever, that this would not be necessary – that there
are,or soon will be – high-tech solutions to the prob-
lem of tracking distance traveled in each EU
Member State. Indeed, solutions that rely on the
Global Positioning System (GPS) are already being
implemented in North America, and non-tax appli-
cations that require similar technology are being
deployed or contemplated in the EU.
Several systems for recording distance and/or calcu-
lating tolls or road user fees are already in use in the
EU, but none would be fully satisfactory for appor-
tioning fuel use without modification.11 On-board
microwave transponders are used to communicate
with roadside equipment and calculate tolls in sever-
al countries, including Austria and Italy. These sys-
tems suffer from the obvious drawback for present
purposes that they only operate where there is road-
side equipment to record distance on selected road-
ways. By comparison, apportionment-based taxation
of motor fuel would require recording by jurisdic-
tion, distance traveled on all roads and streets,
including travel outside the EU.
Switzerland does record all commercial vehicle trav-
el within its borders,but it does not rely primarily on
a satellite-based system – an approach that it reject-
ed after early consideration. Rather, it relies on on-
board recorders, which are switched on and off by
roadside equipment or manually by customs officials
at border stations or by drivers in response to a GPS
signal. GPS is used only to monitor odometer read-
ings and as a backup to the primary system. A
sophisticated system in which locations obtained
from GPS are compared with maps that have been
downloaded and stored on board to calculate
charges for use of German toll roads. It appears that
the German system could be adapted to implemen-
tation of apportionment-based taxation, but the fact
that it is proprietary could pose a problem. The
United Kingdom considered
adopting a satellite-based sys-
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Utah   10,000  0.28  120,000     6.0 20,000     10,000     2,800
Nevada   90,000  0.32  480,000     6.0 80,000 (10,000) (3,200)
Total 100,000 –  600,000     6.0 100,000    0    (400)
Source: Author’s calculations. 
10 Stated differently, Utah is owed
5,600 US dollars, but has collected only
2,800 US dollars, and Nevada is owed
25,600 US dollars, but has collected
28,800 US dollars. McLure, Pitcher and
Turner (2007) describe this system in
greater detail. Allowance can, of course,
be made for distance traveled in jurisdic-
tions that do not participate in the appor-
tionment system,e.g.in Mexico in the case
of the US,and in Switzerland in the case of
the EU.
11 McLure (2008b) describes these sys-
tems in much greater detail.tem to calculate charges for the use of all streets,
roads and highways that would depend on the 
type of road and characteristics of the vehicle
(weight, number of axles and emission class).
Although withdrawn, this kind of system could also
underpin apportionment-based taxation of commer-
cial motor fuel.
The EU has adopted a policy of making the equip-
ment used by microwave and satellite-based toll-
way systems of all Member States interoperable.
But this is presumably only an interim measure;
the European Commission stated in its 2006
Green Paper on Satellite Navigation Applications:
satellite navigation is recommended for its flexi-
bility and its best fit with European charging 
policy, being infrastructure-free and easily
expandable by nature. It allows varying pricing
schemes, interoperability and intelligent transport
system services.
Rather than relying on the GPS system maintained by
the United States, the EU will deploy GALILEO, a
system of thirty satellites circling the earth in geosyn-
chronous orbit. The website of the European
Commission’s Transportation and Energy Directorate
states:
Galileo will offer new and more advanced meth-
ods of user-friendly road charging: charge for the
use of particular roads at particular times with
particular vehicles, or charge users travelling in a
certain urban zone, according to the distance dri-
ven. Although there are other techniques for road
tolling, only satellite navigation leads to a reliable
seamless service. The vehicle will use Galileo to
determine its location and to store the distance dri-
ven on every type of road (charged or free). Then it
reports the results to a monitoring centre for a
central charging entity to invoice the user. This
would work on both inter-urban and urban
roads.12
Unless this assessment is wildly over-optimistic, it
appears that the EU Member States should, in the
not too distant future, be able to replace their
anachronistic purchase-based system of taxing com-
mercial motor fuels with a destination-based system,
relying on satellite tracking, rather than manual
recording, to determine distances traveled in each
Member State.
Legal issues
Before concluding, it will be useful to consider some
legal issues that are grounded in the EC Treaty.13
That treaty provides (in Article 5) for subsidiarity –
the principle that EU legislative action should be
undertaken only when the actions of individual
Member States do not suffice to achieve EU objec-
tives – and for proportionality – the principle that
EU legislation should not go beyond what is
required to achieve such objectives. If – but only if –
purchase-based taxation of commercial motor fuel is
taken to be immutable, minimum tax rates are con-
sistent with subsidiarity; given the existence of that
illogical system,minimum rates are required to ame-
liorate the problems identified earlier, which the
actions of individual Member States create and
aggravate. But a conceptually superior and arguably
more proportionate response would be to abandon
purchase-based taxation in favor of an apportion-
ment-based system. That would eliminate the prob-
lems (not just alleviate them), while fully respecting
the sovereignty of Member States to set their own
tax rates.
It is notoriously difficult to enact EU tax legislation,
since the unanimous approval of all Member States is
required. It may be impossible to gain the agreement
of Member States that benefit from the present pur-
chase-based system to switch to an apportionment-
based system.If so,resort could,in principle,be had to
“enhanced cooperation,” a legislative procedure
under which as few as eight Member States can agree
to “go faster” in area where unanimity cannot be
achieved. The Member States with the highest tax
rates on commercial motor fuel have the most to gain
from using enhanced cooperation to initiate appor-
tionment; they are the ones most under pressure to
hold tax rates down and most vulnerable to poaching
of their tax base if they do not. At the beginning of
2009 eight EU Member States had tax rates of at least
400 euros per liter and two more had rates of at least
380 euros – the European Commission’s target mini-
mum rate for 2014. It does not seem inconceivable
that at least eight of these would opt for an appor-
tionment-based system if they were convinced that
there is a technological solution to the implementa-
tion problem.
The EC Treaty (Article 93) entrusts to the European
Commission the responsibility to make proposals
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“for the harmonization of legislation concerning ...
indirect taxation ...necessary to ensure the establish-
ment and the functioning of the internal market ...”
Thus,if there is to be legislative action to replace the
purchase-based system,be it by a unanimous vote or
by enhanced cooperation, the European Commis-
sion must be convinced of the case for it.
It is interesting to speculate on why the European
Commission has never proposed replacing the pur-
chase-based system, favoring instead minimum or
uniform rates.14 Perhaps it is just inertia: purchase-
based systems existed when the European Single
Market was created,and no one thought of replacing
it. Maybe an apportionment-based system was con-
sidered, but was found too cumbersome, because of
the need for manual recording of distances. Or per-
haps this is just another reflection of the European
Commission’s apparent penchant for uniformity,
even where it may not be desirable.
Maybe the explanation can be attributed in part to
the European Commission’s mandate under the EC
Treaty quoted above. This mandate does not men-
tion respecting the fiscal sovereignty of Member
States or producing a sensible distribution of the tax
base among Member States.The former is,of course,
the realm of subsidiarity, and the desirability of a
sensible distribution of revenues may have seemed
so obvious to those who drafted and ratified the
Treaty that it did not seem necessary to include it in
the European Commission’s mandate.
In any event,it is anomalous that in 2007 the European
Commission proposed raising the minimum tax rate on
commercial motor fuel rather than abandoning the
existing purchase-based system in favor of a satellite-
based system for apportioning motor fuel among
Member States. After all, in 2006, in the Green Paper
mentioned above, it had aptly noted the possibility of
using satellite-based systems for road user charging.15
Concluding remarks: why tax commercial motor fuel?
It seems clear that the present purchase-based sys-
tem of taxing commercial motor fuels in the EU can
and should be replaced by apportionment. But the
same technology that is likely to make an apportion-
ment-based system feasible would also make it pos-
sible to implement more sophisticated systems of
charging for road use directly, arguably rendering
the taxation of commercial motor fuel redundant
and obsolete. Why, then, tax commercial motor fuel
at all, aside from the apparently insatiable appetite
of governments for revenue? As Newbery (2005, 29)
has written, “Road fuel taxes can be justified to a
considerable extent as road user charges,pending the
political and technical developments of more finely
targeted road pricing”.
It seems almost certain that comprehensive systems
of charging for road use will not be applied to pri-
vate automobiles as soon as to commercial vehicles.
Thus, fuel used in private automobiles is likely to
continue to be taxed, at least for a while. If that is
true, imposing no tax on commercial motor fuel,
relying entirely on road user charges, would be an
open invitation to massive fraud.Thus,an apportion-
ment-based system should be considered, if only as
an interim measure.
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